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INTRODUCTION 
The European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ” and “Court”)1 landmark 
ruling in Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement 
GmbH (“Überseering”)2 raises questions about the validity of corporate 
conflict-of-laws rules in many European Union (“EU”) Member 
States.  The decision grants EU businesses greater freedom of 
movement within the European Union3 and significantly alters 
German international company law.4  German courts must now 
recognize “cheap” limited liability companies—entities that were 
incorporated under the looser regulations of another EU Member 
State.5  This development casts doubt on the continued utility of the 
real seat doctrine6 as a conflict-of-laws principle.7  At stake is the 
                                                          
 1. This Note refers to the European Court of Justice as both “ECJ” and the 
“Court.” 
 2. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_ 
doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 
2002). 
 3. See discussion infra Part III (suggesting that the Court’s requirement that host 
states afford companies legal recognition enables companies to move more easily 
across borders within the European Union). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.B.4 (observing that the ECJ rejected Germany’s 
strict requirement that a foreign-incorporated entity reincorporate in Germany upon 
transferring its seat to Germany). 
 5. See Maximilian Steinbeis, EuGH erzwingt Öffnung für “Billig-GmbHs,” 
HANDELSBLATT, Nov. 6, 2002 (commenting that the ECJ’s Überseering ruling enables 
promoters of an entity to circumvent German company formation laws by 
incorporating under less stringent restrictions in countries such as Great Britain or 
the Netherlands).  The minimum capital requirements for the formation of a 
company in Great Britain are substantially lower than those in Germany.  Id.  To 
ensure the protection of creditors, promoters must furnish at least € 25,000 to form a 
company in Germany, whereas Great Britain requires only £100 for the formation of 
a similar limited liability company.  Id. 
 6. This Note uses the terms “real seat doctrine,” “seat theory,” and “company 
seat principle” interchangeably. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III (stating that the ECJ’s Überseering ruling could be 
construed as abolishing the real seat doctrine but arguing that the decision should 
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ability of a host country to impose its legal, economic, and social 
values on companies based within its borders but incorporated 
elsewhere.  For example, without the real seat doctrine, Germany 
may no longer be able to enforce its higher minimum capital 
requirements and protection of workers’ participation in 
management because companies could simply circumvent these rules 
by incorporating in a country with less stringent standards.8  This 
Note advocates a narrow interpretation of the Überseering ruling, 
which modifies, but does not abolish, the seat theory. 
In its decision, the ECJ held that when a company incorporated in 
one EU Member State moves its central place of management to 
another Member State, the host country must recognize the entity 
and allow it access to the host country’s courts.9  In Überseering, a 
company incorporated in the Netherlands moved its center of 
administration to Germany and sought to enforce its contractual 
rights against a German company before German courts.10  The 
German courts applied the German version of the real seat doctrine 
and dismissed the suit, noting that the Dutch company did not have 
legal capacity in Germany because the entity was incorporated in one 
state but had its seat in another state.11  The ECJ decided that a host 
state’s denial of legal capacity to a foreign entity with its place of 
administration in the host state violates the freedom of establishment 
guaranteed under the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(“EC Treaty”).12 
                                                          
be interpreted narrowly as merely modifying the seat theory).  See generally infra notes 
43-48 and accompanying text (defining the real seat doctrine and incorporation 
theory as the two principal approaches for determining a corporation’s nationality—
that is, the country whose law will govern the company when it has contacts with 
more than one jurisdiction). 
 8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (providing examples of unique 
company law standards in Germany that companies could avoid if the incorporation 
theory became the governing conflict-of-laws principle). 
 9. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶¶ 94-95 (rejecting Germany’s strict requirement of 
reincorporation as inconsistent with the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment), available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi 
!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 2002).  The 
transfer of a company’s place of administration constitutes the formation of a 
primary establishment.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 42-43.  This is different from the formation of 
a branch—a secondary establishment.  See, e.g., id. 
 10. See id. ¶¶ 2, 6, 8 (noting that the contractual dispute arose between the 
Dutch company, Überseering BV, and the German entity, Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH, when Überseering BV alleged that Nordic 
Construction performed its contractual obligations inadequately). 
 11. See id. ¶¶ 9-10 (outlining the procedural history of the Überseering case). 
 12. Id. ¶¶ 94-95; CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, arts. 43-48, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 1 (2002) [hereinafter 
EC TREATY] (enshrining the freedom of establishment). 
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This Note analyzes the ECJ’s decision in Überseering.  Part I 
introduces the facts and procedural history of the case and compares 
the real seat doctrine and the state-of-incorporation theory.13  Part I 
also discusses Germany’s strict interpretation of the seat theory and 
details applicable EU law.14  Part II examines the German courts’ 
application of the real seat doctrine to Überseering BV.15  In addition, 
Part II analyzes the ECJ’s findings regarding three questions:  
whether the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment applied 
to the Überseering case;16 whether the application of the German seat 
theory had resulted in a restriction of the right of establishment;17 
and whether a justification existed for that restriction.18  Part II 
concludes with an assessment of the ECJ’s overall holding in 
Überseering.19 
Part III evaluates the impact of the case.  It argues that the decision 
should be interpreted narrowly as modifying the real seat doctrine to 
ensure that host states afford legal recognition to foreign-
incorporated entities, so as to allow them access to the host state’s 
courts.20  Part III rejects the broad interpretation that the ECJ’s ruling 
                                                          
 13. See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B (detailing the origin and procedural history 
of the Überseering action and juxtaposing the seat and incorporation theories as 
alternative approaches to conflict-of-laws problems concerning companies 
incorporated in one EU Member State and having their place of management in 
another Member State).  This Note uses the terms “incorporation theory/doctrine,” 
and “state-of-incorporation theory/doctrine” interchangeably. 
 14. See discussion infra Parts I.C, I.D (noting that foreign-incorporated entities 
with their seat of management in Germany could be denied legal capacity under the 
German real seat doctrine and discussing the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment). 
 15. See discussion infra Part II.A (suggesting that the German courts’ analysis in 
the Überseering case was correct under then-existing German and EU law). 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (reporting that the ECJ found that the Treaty’s 
right of establishment provisions applied to a company such as Überseering BV, 
which was incorporated in one Member State and moved its center of administration 
to another Member State). 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (agreeing with the ECJ that Germany’s denial 
of Überseering BV’s legal capacity and access to courts, which resulted from the 
German reincorporation requirement, constituted a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (examining the ECJ’s finding that the denial of 
a foreign company’s legal capacity  is excessive).  Part II.B.3 also analyzes the Court’s 
discussion of possible justifications for a restriction on the freedom of establishment 
when the restrictive measures do not amount to an outright negation of the 
freedom.  Id. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.B.4 (suggesting that the ECJ intentionally avoided 
choosing between the real seat doctrine and state-of-incorporation theory by limiting 
the scope of its judgment).  The ECJ limited its holding to the requirement that host 
states recognize the legal capacity of companies that have their seat in the host state 
but are incorporated elsewhere.  Id.  Part II.B.4 also suggests that the Court should 
have clarified exactly what type of compelling public interest considerations would 
sufficiently justify a restriction on the right of establishment.  Id. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III (noting that the ECJ did not discuss which 
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abolishes the real seat doctrine and adopts the incorporation 
theory.21 
Part IV recommends four ways of addressing the Überseering ruling.  
First, EU Member States should review and amend their national laws 
to comply with the ECJ’s decision.22  Germany, in particular, should 
replace its strict requirement of reincorporation with other means of 
regulatory enforcement.23  Second, Überseering should be interpreted 
narrowly as modifying, but not abolishing, the real seat doctrine.24  In 
the alternative, host states should be able to force foreign companies 
to comply with local regulatory protections.25  Finally, Part IV suggests 
that EU Member States should strive towards legal harmonization in 
order to diminish the significance of the distinction between the real 
seat doctrine and state-of-incorporation theory and resulting conflict-
of-laws problems.26 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts and Procedural History of the Überseering Case 
The ECJ decision in Überseering arose out of a contractual dispute 
between a German corporation, Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (“Nordic Construction”), and a Dutch 
company, Überseering BV.27  Nordic Construction was incorporated 
                                                          
conflict-of-laws principle should govern EU company law and limited its ruling to 
rejecting Germany’s strict requirement of reincorporation). 
 21. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that the Überseering decision does not 
permit such a broad interpretation because the ECJ did not discuss which state’s laws 
should apply to the company beyond the host state’s initial recognition of the 
company’s legal capacity). 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.A (suggesting that EU Member States modify their 
international company laws to ensure legal recognition of companies that are 
incorporated in a different EU Member State but have their seat in the host 
country). 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.A (suggesting that Germany comply with the ECJ 
ruling in Überseering by eliminating the requirement of reincorporation that it 
imposed on foreign companies that had moved their place of management to 
Germany and later sought to bring legal proceedings there). 
 24. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.C (arguing that a narrow interpretation, or 
at least a limitation on the broad interpretation, is necessary to prevent the race to 
the bottom that would result from enabling companies to circumvent national 
regulations by incorporating abroad). 
 25. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.C. 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV.D (noting that the only means of resolving the 
conflict between the real seat doctrine and state-of-incorporation theory as 
alternative approaches to conflict-of-laws problems is to harmonize company laws in 
the European Union). 
 27. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶¶ 6-12 (reciting the facts and procedural history of the 
case), available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus! 
prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 2002); Judgment of 
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in Germany,28 while Überseering BV was incorporated in the 
Netherlands.29  In 1992, Überseering BV hired Nordic Construction 
to renovate a garage and motel on a piece of land it owned in 
Düsseldorf, Germany.30  In 1994, two German nationals purchased all 
shares of Überseering BV.31  After Nordic Construction completed its 
obligations under the project-management contract, Überseering BV 
accused it of defective contract performance.32 
Überseering BV obtained no compensation from Nordic 
Construction for the defective work and filed an action for contract 
damages before a German Regional Court (“lower court”) in 1996.33  
The lower court dismissed the complaint as inadmissible, a decision 
which the Higher Regional Court affirmed in September of 1998.34  
                                                          
March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice) VII ZR 
370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶¶ 21-29 (outlining the legal dispute underlying the 
Überseering case); see also Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of 
Corporate Laws, 36 INT’L LAW. 1015, 1026 (2002) (describing the origins of the 
Überseering matter). 
 28. Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 2. 
 29. Id. (observing that Überseering BV was registered in Amsterdam and 
Haarlem on August 22, 1990); see Judgment of March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof 
(German Federal Court of Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶¶ 21, 24 
(noting that Überseering BV is a Besloten Vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid, or 
limited liability company, under Netherlands law). 
 30. Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 6 (explaining that Überseering BV employed 
Nordic Construction to refurbish the two buildings according to a project-
management contract between Überseering BV and Nordic Construction, dated 
November 27, 1992). 
 31. See id. ¶¶ 7, 9 (recounting that two Germans from Düsseldorf purchased the 
shares in December 1994). 
 32. See id. ¶ 6 (relaying that Überseering BV asserted that Nordic Construction’s 
paint work was flawed). 
 33. See id. ¶¶ 6, 8 (stating that Überseering BV sued Nordic Construction before 
the Landgericht, or Regional Court, of Düsseldorf, Germany); Judgment of March 30, 
2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH 
ZIP 2003, 718, ¶ 25 (explaining that in its claim, Überseering BV sought the payment 
of 1,163,657.77 DM plus interest for the correction of the defective work and 
resulting damages). 
 34. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 9-10 (explaining that Überseering BV appealed 
to the Oberlandesgericht, or Higher Regional Court, of Düsseldorf, Germany, upon 
dismissal of the action in the Regional Court).  See generally FRITZ BAUR & GERHARD 
WALTER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS RECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (6th ed. 
1992); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES, GERMANY:  A COUNTRY STUDY:  THE 
JUDICIARY, at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+de 
0127) (Aug. 1995) (on file with the American University Law Review) (giving an 
introduction into the German legal system).  The German court system contains four 
levels.  Id.  Amtsgerichte, or local courts, constitute the first level and hear minor 
criminal or civil cases.  Id.  On the next level are the over 100 Landesgerichte, or 
regional courts, which have original jurisdiction over most civil and criminal matters 
and review appeals from local courts.  Id.  Above these are the Oberlandesgerichte, or 
higher regional courts, which review points of law raised in lower courts and have 
original jurisdiction over constitutional cases or those involving treason.  Id.  These 
courts are also the highest authority on the minor cases introduced in the local 
courts.  Id.  The court of highest appeal for most cases is the Bundesgerichtshof, or 
Federal Court of Justice, which has no original jurisdiction.  Id.  Additionally, 
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Both courts determined that Überseering BV lacked legal capacity in 
Germany as a company incorporated in the Netherlands with its 
center of administration in Germany.35  Überseering BV then 
appealed to the Federal Court of Justice,36 which stayed the 
proceedings and certified questions to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling in March 2000.37  Specifically, the Federal Court of Justice 
sought guidance on whether a finding of no legal capacity would be 
inconsistent with the freedom of establishment guaranteed under the 
EC Treaty.38 
The ECJ issued its ruling in the Überseering case on November 5, 
2002.39  The Court held that Germany had to recognize the legal 
capacity of Überseering BV in accordance with the freedom of 
establishment guaranteed under the EC Treaty.40  The Court 
concluded that a host state’s denial of a company’s legal capacity is 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment, and the Court 
required host states to recognize foreign-incorporated entities.41  
Based on this preliminary ruling by the ECJ, the German Federal 
Court of Justice reversed the judgment of the Higher Regional Court 
and remanded the case for a ruling consistent with the ECJ’s 
interpretation of the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment.42 
                                                          
Germany maintains separate specialty courts for administrative, labor, social, fiscal, 
and patent law, each with their own appeal structure.  Id.  Lastly, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court hears appeals regarding the rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution (“Basic Law”) or disputes between branches of government.  Id. 
 35. Judgment of March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of 
Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶ 28; see Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 9 
(explaining that the finding of no legal capacity precluded Überseering BV from 
filing legal actions in Germany). 
 36. Judgment of March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of 
Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶ 29; Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 11; see 
Ebke, supra note 27, at 1022 (remarking that the Federal Court of Justice, or 
Bundesgerichtshof, is the highest court for civil actions in Germany). 
 37. Judgment of March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of 
Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶¶ 13-18; Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 21.  
While the appeal was pending in the Federal Court of Justice, Überseering BV was 
sued in a different German court and ordered to pay architects’ fees for the property 
it owned in Düsseldorf, Germany.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 38. See Judgment of March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court 
of Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶¶ 15-18; Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. 
¶ 21. 
 39. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 94 (holding that a host state’s denial of legal 
capacity to a company incorporated in one Member State and having its seat in the 
host state violates the freedom of establishment enshrined in the EC Treaty). 
 40. See id. ¶¶ 94-95 (declaring that host states may not refuse to recognize a 
foreign corporation’s legal capacity and may not deny it access to the national courts 
when the company moves its seat to the host country). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Judgment of March 13, 2003, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court 
of Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718. 
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B. Real Seat Doctrine vs. Incorporation Theory 
The real seat doctrine and the incorporation theory are two 
competing approaches to determining which state’s laws will govern a 
company’s internal affairs when it has contacts with more than one 
jurisdiction.43  This determination of a corporation’s “nationality” 
becomes relevant when corporate conflict-of-laws problems arise, 
particularly in the European Union, where significant differences 
exist in the substantive laws of the Member States.44  Under the seat 
theory, the controlling law will be that of the country where the 
company’s headquarters are located.45  By contrast, the incorporation 
theory requires the use of the law of the incorporation state.46  Many 
EU Member States, including Germany,47 France, Italy, and Spain, 
adhere to the real seat doctrine, while the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
Ireland, and Denmark follow the incorporation theory.48 
                                                          
 43. See Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law:   A Comparison of the United States 
and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 37 
(2002) (remarking that the real seat doctrine and state-of-incorporation theory 
constitute the “two principal competing theories” regarding the determination of 
corporate nationality); see also Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the 
Postnational Economy:   Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 450-51 (2002) 
(proposing the domestic participation test as an alternative means of determining 
corporate nationality that is better suited for the “postnational” economy).  The 
domestic participation test grants nationality to a corporation if its business 
constitutes a “substantial, socioeconomic participation in the state’s economy.”  Id. at 
454.  If the firm meets those requirements, then it will be deemed a domestic 
company—regardless of where it has its place of incorporation or its seat.  Id. 
 44. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (discussing some of the major 
differences between the corporate laws of the EU Member States, particularly 
German and British rules on company formation). 
 45. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
 46. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1022-23 (stating that the German Federal Court of 
Justice adopted the real seat doctrine as the governing conflict-of-laws principle after 
World War II; all German courts have consistently applied it since). 
 48. See Kersting, supra note 43, at 2 (observing that many EU Member States 
endorse the company seat principle); see also Ebke, supra note 27, at 1016 (claiming 
that the majority of countries in the European Union follow some form of the seat 
theory); Danny Ray Garza, Which Style Should Govern?, 11 CURRENTS:   INT’L TRADE L.J. 
76, 78 (2002) (remarking that a number of EU Member States adhere to the 
company seat principle); Klause Heine, Regulatory Competition Between Company Laws 
in the European Union:  The Überseering Case, 38 INTERECONOMICS 102 (2003) (noting 
that Germany, France, Italy, and Spain have incorporated the real seat doctrine into 
their laws); Catherine Holst, Note, European Company Law After Centros:   Is the EU on 
the Road to Delaware?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323, 323 (2002) (reporting that the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark follow the state-of-
incorporation theory, while the remaining EU Member States adhere to the real seat 
doctrine) (citing Robert R. Drury, The Regulation and Recognition of Foreign 
Corporations:   Responses to the “Delaware Syndrome,”  57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 165, 187 
(1988)).  See generally Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law:   A Cross-
Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 865-66 (2002) (outlining the 
historical origins of the real seat doctrine); Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future of 
Codetermination After Centros:   Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 
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The ECJ ruling in the Überseering case addressed the German 
courts’ application of the real seat doctrine to Überseering BV, which 
had resulted in a denial of the company’s legal capacity and the 
ability to bring legal proceedings in Germany.49  Under the seat 
theory, only the law of the state with the most significant relationship 
to the corporation should govern its internal affairs,50 including its 
“formation, its life, and its liquidation.”51  Accordingly, only the 
country where the company has its seat may regulate it because the 
company’s activities affect that state the most.52  A corporation’s “seat” 
is its place of management—its real or effective seat, rather than the 
seat that is memorialized in the company’s articles of incorporation.53 
The principle underlying the seat theory is a desire to impose the 
host state’s company law standards.54  The theory is based on the 
conviction that a company should abide by the laws of the state where 
it carries on its principal business and should not be able to escape 
the “legal, economic, and social values” of that country.55  The real 
                                                          
8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 609, 610-11 (2003) (noting that EU Member States 
have traditionally followed the real seat doctrine, while the United States has 
adopted the state-of-incorporation theory) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971)). 
 49. See Überseering 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 2, 9-11, 21 (2002) (describing the proceedings 
that led the German Federal Court of Justice to refer the case to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling). 
 50. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1015 (commenting that the seat theory is a 
conflict-of-laws principle that is based on the assumption that only the law of one 
country should regulate the internal affairs of a company).  According to the real 
seat doctrine, the most appropriate country to regulate a corporation is the country 
where the company has its headquarters, or the country with which the company has 
the most significant commercial ties.  Id. at 1015-16. 
 51. Id. at 1023; see Garza, supra note 48, at 78 (noting that the term “internal 
affairs” contains, among other things, the relations between a company’s 
shareholders, officers, and directors) (citing Werner F. Ebke, Company Law and the 
European Union:   Centralized Versus Decentralized Lawmaking, 31 INT’L LAW. 961, 967 
(1997)). 
 52. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1027 (claiming that the seat theory assumes that 
the real seat country is most affected by a company’s actions). 
 53. See id. at 1016 (explaining that the real seat of a company is generally its place 
of management).  According to the interpretation of the German Federal Court of 
Justice, the real seat of a company is “where ‘the fundamental business decisions by 
the managers are being implemented effectively into day-to-day business activities.’”  
Id. at 1022 (quoting Judgment of March 21, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof (German 
Federal Court of Justice) BGHZ 97, 269 (272)). 
 54. Ebke, supra note 27, at 1027-28. 
 55. Id. at 1028.  One illustration of a country’s unique legal and economic values 
is the protection of minority shareholders and employees that is available under 
German law but not under the laws of other EU countries.  See id. (citing Written 
Observations submitted by the Commission of the European Communities pursuant 
to article 20(2) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
Aug. 30, 2000, JURM (2000) 72 CS.hg at 22).  If a company were able to have its 
principal place of business in Germany while incorporating in another country, then 
it could avoid the German laws that protect minority shareholders and employees.  
Id. 
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seat doctrine promotes the equal treatment of corporations, as the 
theory requires all companies that have their place of management in 
a certain country to incorporate in the same state.56  The doctrine 
allows host countries to remove a company’s choice of law, thereby 
helping to prevent a race to the bottom.  Companies are not able to 
shop around for the legal system that is most suitable to their needs 
while maintaining their principal places of business in other 
countries.57 
The incorporation theory is an alternative to the real seat 
doctrine.58  It applies the law of the state of incorporation to regulate 
a company.59  The state-of-incorporation doctrine promotes the 
incorporators’ freedom of choice regarding the law that will regulate 
the internal affairs of their companies.60  Advantages of the 
incorporation theory include “certainty, predictability, uniformity of 
result, protection of justified expectation of the parties,” and ease of 
determining the applicable law.61  However, contrary to the real seat 
                                                          
 56. See id. at 1027-28 (discussing the real seat doctrine’s 
Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz, or emphasis on equal treatment).  Because all companies 
having their principal place of business in a country must incorporate in that state, 
these entities cannot subject themselves to less stringent rules by incorporating in 
another state.  Id.  Thus, they must all follow the same set of regulations—the 
company law of the real seat state.  Id. at 1028. 
 57. See Holst, supra note 48, at 328; see also Ebke, supra note 27, at 1028 
(concluding that the requirement that companies be incorporated in the state where 
their place of management is located produces a “level playing field and prevents 
companies from escaping that state’s legal controls through incorporation in a 
jurisdiction that has less stringent laws”); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of 
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice:  Evidence on the “Race” Debate and 
Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1869-70 (2002) (claiming that the 
seat theory represents one of the reasons why regulatory competition within the 
European Union is very limited). 
 58. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that the real seat 
doctrine and incorporation theory are two competing approaches to determining 
the nationality of a corporation). 
 59. See Kersting, supra note 43, at 37 (stating that the location of a company’s 
registered office determines its nationality under the incorporation theory). 
 60. See Dammann, supra note 48, at 609 (relaying that the incorporation theory 
allows a company to incorporate in the state with the most desirable company law, 
which will then govern its internal affairs) (citing Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, 
From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2000)); see also 
Ebke, supra note 27, at 1028 (noting that under the state-of-incorporation doctrine, 
the promoters of a company can choose the legal system that is most suitable to the 
corporation).  By comparison, under the real seat doctrine, the promoters’ only 
choice is the company’s principal place of business.  Id. 
 61. Ebke, supra note 27, at 1031-32 (citing Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on 
Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 162 (1985) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (1971))).  But see 
id. at 1032 (reporting that opponents of the incorporation doctrine note that 
countries that have adopted the incorporation theory have been applying local 
internal affairs laws, which has resulted in the application of the law of a 
combination of jurisdictions). 
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doctrine, the incorporation theory may lead to a race to the bottom, 
where companies seek to incorporate in the country with the least-
stringent regulations while conducting their business elsewhere.62 
C. The German Seat Theory Prior to Überseering 
While the real seat doctrine is generally only concerned with 
placing jurisdiction over a company in the courts of the seat state,63 
the German version of the seat theory went further.  This version 
drastically affected the legal capacity of a foreign-incorporated entity, 
raising questions of compatibility with the EC Treaty.64 
When a foreign company has its central place of management in 
Germany, then the corporation must follow German company law.65  
However, under pre-Überseering German law, foreign corporations had 
legal capacity in Germany only if their place of management and 
incorporation were in the same state.66  Companies incorporated 
outside of Germany and having their main seat within Germany 
lacked legal capacity in Germany.67  Similarly, companies 
incorporated in Germany lost their legal capacity if they moved their 
                                                          
 62. See, e.g., Dammann, supra note 48, at 609 (explaining that the incorporation 
theory may induce states to adopt “ever more management-friendly rules” to draw 
companies to incorporate under their jurisdiction, which will ultimately lead to a 
race to the bottom).  The real seat doctrine, by contrast, prevents this problem by 
ensuring that a company’s place of incorporation and principal place of business 
remain the same.  Id. at 611.  Under the seat theory, a company has only a limited 
choice of law:   if a company wants a more desirable set of corporate rules to govern 
its internal affairs, then it must relocate its seat to that jurisdiction—a move that is 
usually associated with disproportionately high costs.  Id.  See generally infra note 206 
(juxtaposing arguments that regulatory competition will lead to a race to the bottom 
or a race to the top). 
 63. See Kersting, supra note 43, at 37 (indicating that the seat theory uses a 
company’s place of administration to determine its nationality for purposes of 
finding its home jurisdiction). 
 64. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text (discussing the German 
interpretation of the real seat doctrine prior to the ECJ’s ruling in Überseering). 
 65. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1022 (noting that the German seat theory requires 
companies that have their seat in Germany to incorporate there, while a company 
that does not have its seat in Germany cannot incorporate under German law); see 
also Harald Herrmann, How to Classify Foreign Entities in Germany, INT’L TAX REV., Dec.-
Jan. 2003, at 42, 43 (explaining the practical implications of the seat theory). 
 66. See Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (commenting that the origin of the dispute 
in Überseering lay in German company law); see also Herrmann, supra note 65, at 43 
(detailing the meaning of the Sitztheorie or seat theory).  See generally A.M. ARNULL ET 
AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 469 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that several Member States 
require that a company be incorporated in the seat state or the host state would not 
recognize its legal capacity). 
 67. See Herrmann, supra note 65, at 43.  See generally ARNULL, supra note 66, at 468 
(noting that Member States’ national laws can impede the move of a company’s 
central administration because the host country may require it to reestablish itself in 
the new jurisdiction).  Such provisions constitute a denial of the company’s legal 
capacity.  Id. 
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place of management abroad.68  The result was that such companies 
could not bring legal actions in Germany because German law failed 
to recognize them as corporations.69  The only way for those 
companies to acquire legal capacity in Germany was to dissolve and 
reincorporate in Germany.70  Importantly, the reincorporation 
requirement applies only to companies incorporated outside of 
Germany and having their central management, that is, their main 
seat, in Germany.71  It does not affect foreign-incorporated companies 
that only seek to establish a branch or subsidiary, that is, a secondary 
establishment, in Germany.72  The policy behind the German version 
of the real seat doctrine is a desire to impose Germany’s legal, 
economic, and social values on companies within its territory, 
including its rules on workers’ participation in management and 
protection of minority shareholders.73 
According to the German version of the real seat doctrine, if a 
company was incorporated in a state where it did not maintain its 
                                                          
 68. See Gert Brandner, Vereinbarkeit der Sitztheorie mit der Niederlassungsfreiheit—
Anmerkung zum Überseering-Urteil des EuGH, at http://www.der-syndikus.de/briefings 
/eu/eu_025.htm (last visited June 12, 2004) (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (describing the repercussions of the German real seat doctrine for 
German companies moving their seat to another country).  See generally ARNULL, 
supra note 66, at 468 (observing that under the law of some EU Member States, a 
company must give up its legal capacity when it transfers its headquarters or place of 
administration abroad). 
 69. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1026-27 (noting that the seat theory inescapably 
results in the non-recognition of companies whose seat and place of incorporation 
are in two different states); see also Herrmann, supra note 65, at 43 (spelling out the 
practical consequences of German international company law).  Importantly, the 
theoretical repercussions of non-recognition of a foreign corporation differ from its 
practical consequences.  See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1034-35.  The theoretical 
consequences of non-recognition include an entity’s lack of access to the national 
courts as an active party and the loss of the limited liability status.  Id. at 1035.  
However, these drastic results almost never occur because the reincorporation 
requirement is well-known in the business world and foreign entities have largely 
chosen to establish subsidiaries under German law, rather than to move the 
companies’ real seat into Germany.  Id. at 1035-36. 
 70. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 5, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi 
/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 
(Nov. 5, 2002); Heine, supra note 48, at 102 (explaining that under German law, 
foreign corporations with a seat in Germany had to liquidate and reincorporate in 
Germany in order to acquire legal capacity there).  France, Italy, and Spain had 
similar conflict of law rules.  Id. 
 71. Heine, supra note 48, at 102. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Dammann, supra note 48, at 611-12 (remarking that it was the real seat 
doctrine that allowed Germany to develop its laws on workers’ participation in 
company management because promoters were not able to circumvent those 
regulations by incorporating elsewhere).  The seat theory also protects the interests 
of German creditors with respect to foreign corporations that may have been 
incorporated under laws that require little initial capital.  See Herrmann, supra note 
65, at 43. 
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principal place of business, then the real seat state could refuse to 
recognize the company’s legal capacity.74  Überseering BV had its real 
seat in Germany and its place of incorporation in the Netherlands.75  
According to its interpretation of the real seat doctrine, Germany 
refused to recognize Überseering BV as a corporation.76  Überseering 
BV could gain legal capacity only if it reincorporated in Germany.77  
As a consequence, Überseering BV was unable to pursue its 
contractual claims against Nordic Construction in the German court 
system.78 
Before Überseering, a long debate persisted about whether the 
German real seat doctrine was consistent with the freedom of 
establishment under the EC Treaty.79  The German courts’ 
application of the seat theory to Überseering BV gave the European 
Court of Justice the opportunity to rule on this question.80 
                                                          
 74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Ebke, supra note 27, at 1034 
(claiming that a controversial feature of the seat theory is the non-recognition of 
companies in the real seat state if they are incorporated elsewhere).  Some 
commentators have suggested that the real seat doctrine imposes the non-
recognition of a corporation’s legal capacity as a sanction for being incorporated in 
the wrong place.  See id. at 1035 (citing Bernhard Grossfeld, Commentary, in JULIUS 
VON STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN:   INTERNATIONALES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 7, 
11, 105-11 (1998)). 
 75. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 9 (relating that Überseering moved its center of 
administration to Germany but was still incorporated under Netherlands law). 
 76. See Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (explaining that foreign companies have 
legal capacity in Germany if their place of incorporation and place of management 
are in the same state); see also Herrmann, supra note 65, at 43 (outlining the aspects 
of German international company law that affected the Überseering action). 
 77. See, e.g., Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (noting that Überseering BV had no 
legal existence in Germany and therefore had no capacity to sue in German courts 
unless it moved its place of incorporation to Germany).  But see supra note 69 
(juxtaposing the theoretical and practical consequences of the real seat state’s non-
recognition of a company that is incorporated elsewhere).  It is fairly easy and 
inexpensive for a foreign corporation to avoid the negative consequences of non-
recognition by forming a subsidiary entity in Germany, rather than establishing the 
company’s main seat there.   Ebke, supra note 27, at 1035. 
 78. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1035 (explaining that non-recognition of a 
company’s legal capacity results in the inability to bring legal proceedings in the host 
state). 
 79. See id. at 1026 (observing that the ECJ decision in Centros initiated a debate 
about whether the real seat doctrine was compatible with the Treaty provisions on 
the freedom of establishment); see also Herrmann, supra note 65, at 43 (noting that 
some German legal scholars had questioned whether the seat theory, as practiced in 
Germany, was consistent with the EC Treaty, while others had suggested that mutual 
recognition of business forms within the European Union was beyond the scope of 
the EC Treaty). 
 80. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 93-94 (answering the question of whether the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment were compatible with the German 
seat theory). 
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D. European Union Law Regarding Freedom of Establishment 
While corporations exist by virtue of the national law of the 
individual EU Member States,81 once a company exists, the EC Treaty 
confers certain rights on it.82  The freedom of establishment is one of 
those rights, as chapter two of the EC Treaty sets it out as a 
fundamental freedom.83 
Both natural persons and legal persons have the right of 
establishment.84  Article 43 provides that “restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited.”85  Article 48 makes the 
right of establishment applicable to legal persons:  “Companies or 
firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Community shall . . . be treated in the 
same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States.”86  
                                                          
 81. See Garza, supra note 48, at 77 (explaining that the laws of the individual EU 
Member States control the internal operations of a company) (citing Werner F. 
Ebke, Company Law and the European Union:  Centralized Versus Decentralized Lawmaking, 
31 INT’L LAW. 961, 962 (1997)). 
 82. See id. at 77-78 (conveying that Member States may not restrict interstate 
trade due to the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods, services, capital, 
as well as natural and legal persons); see also ARNULL, supra note 66, at 464 (pointing 
out that Article 48 of the EC Treaty vows to treat legal persons and natural persons 
within the European Union alike).  A natural person’s nationality can be equated 
with a company’s place of incorporation, place of management, or principal place of 
business, which “serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular 
[s]tate . . . .”  Id. (quoting Case 212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
1999 E.C.R. I-1459, I-1491, ¶ 20, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 573 (1999)).  It follows that 
companies gain EU rights by virtue of their national rights under incorporation just 
like natural persons acquire EU citizenship as a consequence of having citizenship of 
a Member State.  See id. at 465. 
 83. See EC TREATY arts. 43-48 (outlining the right of establishment in the 
European Union); see also Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury & Comm’rs of 
Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail & General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5510, 
¶ 15, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713, 724 (1988) (noting at the outset that the freedom of 
establishment is a fundamental right in the European Community).  See generally 
ARNULL, supra note 66, at 464-69 (providing an overview of the meaning of the right 
of establishment under EU law prior to the Überseering case); KAREN DAVIES, 
UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW 144-48 (2001) (discussing the basic freedom 
of establishment rights provided in the EC Treaty and the exceptions to these 
rights); DAVID MEDHURST, A BRIEF AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EU LAW 139-46 (3d ed. 
2001) (examining the right of establishment generally). 
 84. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; see also ARNULL, supra note 66, at 
464 (stating that Article 48 confers the right of establishment on companies and 
firms). 
 85. EC TREATY art. 43.  Article 43 further states that “[s]uch prohibition shall also 
apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by 
nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State.”  Id.  
Additionally, “[f]reedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and 
pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in 
particular companies or firms . . . .”  Id. 
 86. EC TREATY art. 48.  Article 48 defines “companies or firms” as “companies or 
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This means that corporations may establish themselves in an EU 
member country that is different from their state of incorporation—
generally by forming an agency, branch, or subsidiary.87  The law that 
applies to those companies is determined by reference to one of 
three connecting factors:  the location of their incorporation, place 
of management, or principal place of business.88  Importantly, the 
placing of these three connecting factors on the same level indicates 
that the EU does not have a preference for which law should govern a 
company’s internal affairs—the laws of the seat state or the laws of 
the state of incorporation.89 
Before Überseering, two major cases had interpreted the meaning of 
the Treaty provisions on the right of establishment.90  First, the ECJ 
held in The Queen v. H.M. Treasury & Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 
ex parte Daily Mail & General Trust PLC that Articles 43 and 48 do not 
confer a right on companies incorporated in one EU Member State 
to move their central place of management to another Member 
State.91  The ECJ examined the freedom of establishment from the 
perspective of the state of incorporation, which, it found, may 
legitimately prevent corporations from moving their place of 
management out of the country.92  Second, in Centros v. Erhvervs-og 
                                                          
firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and 
other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-
profit-making.”  Id. 
 87. See ARNULL, supra note 66, at 464 (referring to the ECJ’s finding in Centros 
that companies and firms may exercise their freedom of establishment in another 
Member State through a secondary establishment) (citing Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-
1491, ¶ 20, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 584). 
 88. See id. (stating that these connecting factors tie the company to the laws of a 
Member State much like nationality ties a natural person to a particular legal system) 
(citing Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1491, ¶ 20, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 584). 
 89. See EC TREATY art. 48. 
 90. See Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury & Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 
ex parte Daily Mail & General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713 
(1988) (analyzing the ability of the state of incorporation to restrict a company’s 
move to another Member State); Case C-212/97, Centros v. Erhvervs-og 
Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999) (discussing a 
host state’s inability to refuse to register a branch of a foreign entity). 
 91. See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5512, ¶ 25, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 726 
(interpreting the Treaty provision on the freedom of establishment under then-
present European Community law standards).  At the time of the ECJ’s ruling in 
Daily Mail, Articles 52 and 58 contained the freedom of establishment provision for 
natural and legal persons.  See id. at 5506, ¶ 1, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 721.  Articles 43 
and 48 have since replaced them in the amended version of the EC Treaty due to 
renumbering.  Ebke, supra note 27, at 1020. 
 92. See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5512, ¶ 25, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 726 (answering 
the first question that the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, had 
certified to the ECJ).  The matter giving rise to the ECJ’s ruling involved the attempt 
by a company incorporated and managed in the United Kingdom to move its center 
of administration to the Netherlands while retaining its legal capacity in the United 
Kingdom.  See id. at 5506-07, ¶¶ 2, 6, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 721-22.  The admitted 
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Selskabsstyrelsen, the ECJ dealt with an EU Member State’s refusal to 
register a branch of a company incorporated in another Member 
State where that company’s intent was to conduct its principal 
business in the host state and to escape the host state’s minimum 
capital regulations.93  Despite the company’s obvious attempt to 
circumvent more stringent corporate rules, the ECJ held that the host 
state’s refusal to register the branch constituted an infringement on 
the right of establishment and thus violated the EC Treaty.94   
In essence, the Daily Mail and Centros decisions establish that the 
freedom of establishment provisions allow the state where a company 
is incorporated to prevent that entity from moving its main seat to 
another Member State (primary establishment) but prohibit a host 
state from refusing to allow a foreign-incorporated company to 
establish a branch in its territory (secondary establishment).95  It is 
unclear, however, to what extent these cases may be interpreted 
beyond their actual holdings. 
                                                          
reason for this intended transfer was the company’s desire to avoid the payment of 
tax under UK law that it would incur when selling its assets and subsequently buying 
its own shares.  Id. at 5507-08, ¶ 7, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 722.  After long and 
unsuccessful negotiations with the UK Treasury to obtain consent for its transfer, 
Daily Mail and General Trust PLC brought a legal proceeding and claimed that a 
company had the right to move its center of administration without prior consent 
from the state of incorporation pursuant to the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment.  Id. at 5508, ¶ 8, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 722.  Upon certification of 
questions by the English court, the ECJ pointed out that corporations exercise their 
freedom of establishment through establishing agencies, branches, or subsidiaries or 
through participating in a company’s incorporation in another EU Member State.  
Id. at 5511, ¶ 17, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 725.  The Court ultimately held that the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment do not bestow on a company the right to 
transfer its main place of management from its state of incorporation to another EU 
Member State.  Id. at 5512, ¶ 25, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 726. 
 93. See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1487, ¶ 2, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 581 (explaining 
that Centros Ltd. had its registered office in the United Kingdom and was seeking to 
establish a branch in Denmark to carry on its principal business there).  Both owners 
of Centros Ltd. were Danish nationals whose company had never traded in the 
United Kingdom.  Id. at I-1487, ¶ 3, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 581.  When the Danish 
Trade and Companies Board refused to register a branch in Denmark, the 
company’s owners filed an action claiming that they were entitled to establish a 
branch pursuant to the Treaty provisions on the freedom of establishment.  Id. at I-
1488, ¶¶ 7, 8, 10, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 581-82.  The Danish court sought guidance 
from the ECJ.  Id. at I-1489, ¶ 13, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 582. 
 94. See id. at I-1494, ¶ 30, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 586 (finding that Denmark’s 
refusal to register a branch of Centros Ltd. was inconsistent with the EC Treaty 
because it prevented a company from exercising its freedom to set up a secondary 
establishment). 
 95. See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5512, ¶ 25, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 726 (holding 
that a company has no right to transfer its control and management to another 
Member State if the original Member State and place of incorporation objects); 
Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1494, ¶ 30, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 586 (holding that a Member 
State cannot refuse to register a branch of a company incorporated in another 
Member State). 
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The Treaty provisions on the freedom of establishment are relevant 
to the Überseering proceeding because Überseering BV was deemed 
under German law to have moved its seat from the Netherlands to 
Germany.96  The company could thus be seen as exercising its right of 
establishment. 
II. THE COURTS’ DECISIONS IN THE ÜBERSEERING CASE 
A. The German Courts’ Rulings 
1. The German courts’ analysis conformed to then-existing German law 
The Higher Regional Court applied the real seat doctrine in 
accordance with German law,97 which meant that the law of the 
country where Überseering BV had its center of administration would 
determine whether it possessed legal capacity.98  The Higher Regional 
Court found that the acquisition of all shares in the company by two 
Germans constituted a transfer of Überseering BV’s center of 
administration from the Netherlands to Germany.99  Based on this 
finding and in accordance with the real seat doctrine, the Higher 
Regional Court correctly applied German law to the Überseering 
action.100  Under German law, a foreign-incorporated company with 
its place of management in Germany could only acquire legal 
capacity if it reincorporated in Germany.101  Because Überseering BV 
did not reincorporate in Germany, the Higher Regional Court 
properly held that Überseering BV lacked legal capacity and could 
                                                          
 96. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶¶ 7, 9, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi 
/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J028 
(Nov. 5, 2002). 
 97. See id. ¶ 4 (mentioning that the company seat principle is established in the 
German High Court’s case law and that most legal commentators in Germany 
approve of it); see also Ebke, supra note 27, at 1022-23 (noting the consistent 
application of the real seat doctrine in Germany). 
 98. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 4, 9 (conveying that Germany follows the seat 
theory, which applies the laws of the country where the company has its center of 
administration). 
 99. See id. ¶¶ 7, 9 (commenting that a Higher Regional Court in Germany found 
that Überseering BV’s actual center of administration was in Düsseldorf, Germany).  
The governments of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as well as the 
European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Surveillance Authority maintained in 
their submissions to the ECJ that Überseering BV did not intend to move its center 
of administration to Germany, given the consequences of such a transfer under 
German law.  Id. ¶ 48. 
 100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 101. See discussion supra Part I.C (examining the German seat theory prior to the 
Überseering decision). 
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not bring legal actions in Germany.102  The holding of the German 
courts certainly conformed to then-existing German law.103 
2. The German courts’ analysis conformed to ECJ precedent 
The reasoning of the German courts was also proper with respect 
to then-existing EU law.104  After the ECJ’s rulings in Daily Mail and 
Centros, the consensus among German legal commentators was that 
the ECJ found the real seat doctrine to be compatible with the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment.105  Because the ECJ’s 
previous rulings on the freedom of establishment in Daily Mail and 
Centros did not provide sufficient guidance to decide the Überseering 
case,106 the German Federal Court of Justice was justified in seeking 
clarification on the applicable conflict-of-laws principles.107 
                                                          
 102. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 9 (observing that the Higher Regional Court 
determined that Germany could not recognize Überseering BV’s legal capacity as a 
company incorporated in the Netherlands but having its place of management in 
Germany). 
 103. See § 50 Nr. 1 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure) (providing that an 
entity may be an active party to a legal proceeding if it has legal capacity); see also 
Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 3 (relating that the German Code of Civil Procedure 
requires an action to be dismissed if it was initiated by a party that does not have 
legal capacity).  See generally discussion supra Part I.C (discussing the German seat 
theory before Überseering). 
 104. See infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text (highlighting the gaps in EU 
corporate conflict-of-laws rules prior to Überseering). 
 105. See, e.g., Ebke, supra note 27, at 1018-20 (relaying the pre-Überseering 
consensus that Germany was not required to recognize a foreign-incorporated 
company’s legal capacity under international law); Garza, supra note 48, at 78 
(noting that the requirement of reincorporation in the seat state was legitimate 
under pre-Überseering EU company law); see also SLAVICA VANOVAC, HAARMANN HÜGEL, 
EUGH:  VERSTOß DER SITZTHEORIE GEGEN DEN EG-VERTRAG:  ART. 43, 48, 293 EGV; 
ÜBERSEERING/NCC, at http://www.hugelaw.com/new/texte/wi03sitztheorie.html 
(2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (clarifying that the ECJ 
corrected that interpretation of Daily Mail in its Überseering ruling).  See generally Holst, 
supra note 48, at 327 (relating that some scholars contend that Centros abolished the 
real seat doctrine, while others maintain that the decision only concerned the 
freedom of secondary establishment) (citing Werner Ebke, Centros:  Some Realities 
and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 627 (2000); Wulf-Henning Roth, Case 
Note, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 147 (2000)); Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (explaining 
that the ECJ in Centros did not rule on whether the incorporation theory or the real 
seat doctrine was to be the governing conflict-of-laws principle in the European 
Union). 
 106. See Judgment of March 30, 2000, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court 
of Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718, ¶ 42 (declaring that the answer to 
whether the application of the real seat doctrine in the Überseering case would be 
consistent with the freedom of establishment could not be directly deduced from the 
ECJ’s prior rulings in Daily Mail and Centros).  See generally supra note 105. 
 107. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 21 (reciting the two questions that the German 
Federal Court of Justice certified to the ECJ); see also infra note 119 (describing the 
procedure for obtaining a preliminary ruling from the ECJ).  The German Federal 
Court of Justice stayed proceedings while waiting for the ECJ’s preliminary ruling on 
the matter.  Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 21. 
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Neither Daily Mail nor Centros directly addressed Überseering BV’s 
situation.  Daily Mail concerned the ability of the state of 
incorporation to restrict a company’s move to another Member 
State,108 and Centros dealt with a host state’s inability to refuse to 
register a branch of a foreign entity.109 The Überseering case, by 
contrast, involved a host state’s refusal to recognize a foreign 
company’s legal capacity when that entity had moved its central place 
of management to the host state.110  The Daily Mail decision was not 
applicable to the Überseering case111 because the former concerned the 
relationship between a company and the incorporation state, whereas 
the latter raised questions about the powers of the seat state.112 
The ECJ’s ruling in Centros was also not directly on point since 
Centros Ltd. had sought to establish a branch in another EU Member 
State, while the owners of Überseering BV never intended to establish 
a branch.113  Instead, Überseering BV was deemed under German law 
to have moved its center of administration and control to Germany—
a primary establishment rather than a branch.114  Because the 
previous case law of the ECJ did not address the legal question in 
Überseering,115 the Higher Regional Court was likely justified in its 
decision to apply the German seat theory, which resulted in the 
denial of Überseering BV’s legal capacity. 
                                                          
 108. Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury & Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, ex 
parte Daily Mail & General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5506, ¶ 1, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 
713, 721 (1988). 
 109. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-
1459, I-1490, ¶ 16, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 583 (1999). 
 110. See discussion supra Part I.A (detailing the facts and procedural history of the 
Überseering case). 
 111. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶¶ 62-71 (discussing the differences 
between the situation in Daily Mail and that in Überseering); VANOVAC, supra note 105 
(contending that the relations between a company and its state of incorporation, 
which were at issue in Daily Mail, are regulated pursuant to the law of the 
incorporation state).  Accordingly, the Daily Mail decision does not contain any 
revelations about the compatibility of the real seat doctrine and the freedom of 
establishment.  Id. 
 112. Compare Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713 (analyzing the 
right of the state of incorporation to restrict a company’s ability to move its center of 
management and control out of the country), with Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919 
(evaluating the power of the seat state to deny a foreign company’s legal capacity). 
 113. Compare Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1487, ¶¶ 2-3, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 581 
(noting that the owners of Centros Ltd. had requested Danish authorities to register 
a branch of the company, which they refused to do), with Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. 
¶¶ 7, 9 (recounting that the acquisition by German nationals of all shares in 
Überseering BV constituted a transfer of the company’s management seat). 
 114. Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 7, 9. 
 115. See discussion supra Part I.D (describing the ECJ’s decisions in Centros and 
Daily Mail on freedom of establishment in the European Union); see also supra note 
105 and accompanying text (summarizing the pre-Überseering consensus among legal 
scholars that the seat theory was compatible with the freedom of establishment). 
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An argument could be made, however, that the distinction between 
the situation in Centros and that in Überseering is artificial and 
irrelevant, as it assumes a significant difference between the 
formation of a secondary versus primary establishment.116  If the 
German courts had not imputed artificial relevance into the 
distinction between Centros and Überseering, they would arguably have 
had to recognize that Centros demands that Germany accept the legal 
capacity of Überseering BV.117  On the other hand, the establishment 
of a branch has less significant implications for the host state than 
does the transfer of the company’s seat.  It seems reasonable to allow 
a host state to exert greater control over companies that have their 
seat and carry on their primary business within that country than over 
corporations that have merely established a branch there. 
Due to the lack of clarity in then-existing EU law,118 the German 
Federal Court of Justice was certainly justified in asking the ECJ for 
guidance on the matter.119  The German court first asked the ECJ to 
                                                          
 116. See Holst, supra note 48, at 329 (concluding that the ECJ defined the term 
“branch” so broadly in its Centros ruling that it would essentially represent a “seat” in 
the view of the states that follow the real seat doctrine).  Compare Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 
at I-1487, ¶ 2, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 581 (relaying that the dispute arose out of 
Denmark’s refusal to register a branch of Centros Ltd.—a secondary establishment), 
with Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 6-10 (observing that the ECJ’s review of the 
Überseering matter sprang from a German court’s denial of Überseering BV’s legal 
capacity as a consequence of the company’s transfer of its place of management and 
control – the founding of a primary establishment). 
 117. See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1494, ¶ 30, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. at 586 (holding that 
a host country’s refusal to register a branch of a foreign-incorporated entity violates 
the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment). 
 118. See ARNULL, supra note 66, at 466-69 (describing the confusion about the 
meaning of the ECJ’s rulings in Daily Mail and Centros); see also Werner Ebke, 
Centros:  Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 629 (2000) 
(contending that the ECJ’s case law on what amounts to an illegitimate restriction on 
the freedom of primary or secondary establishment is inconsistent and does not 
always allow for logical deduction of a rule for every situation that may arise in this 
area).  Part of the problem with interpreting the ECJ precedent is that legal scholars 
have speculated far beyond the Court’s actual holdings in Daily Mail and Centros in an 
effort to bring light to some of the unclear language and ambiguous statements in 
the Court’s dicta.  Id. 
 119. See ARNULL, supra note 66, at 200-02 (explaining that parties may ask the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 of the EC Treaty).  Article 234 provides in 
relevant part: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; . . . 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member 
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the 
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of 
Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
EC TREATY art. 234.  Because the ECJ is not bound by previous decisions, national 
courts may ask for clarification or preliminary judgments despite the fact that a 
previous ECJ judgment may be binding precedent on the issue before the national 
court.  See ARNULL, supra note 66, at 200-02. 
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determine whether the application of the real seat doctrine is 
inconsistent with the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment if it leads to the non-recognition of a foreign-
incorporated company.120  In the event the ECJ answered the first 
question in the affirmative, the German Federal Court of Justice 
asked whether legal capacity would have to be determined with 
reference to the laws of the state of incorporation.121 
B. The ECJ’s Judgment 
The ECJ properly concluded that a host state’s denial of the legal 
capacity of a company incorporated in another EU Member State 
constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the freedom of 
establishment.122  However, the Court failed to provide sufficient 
guidance on the circumstances under which a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment may be justified.123 
The ECJ analyzed the Überseering matter pursuant to its authority 
under Article 234 of the EC Treaty.124  It reviewed the case under a 
                                                          
 120. The court presented the question: 
Are Articles 43 EC and 48 EC to be interpreted as meaning that the freedom 
of establishment of companies precludes the legal capacity, and capacity to 
be a party to legal proceedings, of a company validly incorporated under the 
law of one Member State from being determined according to the law of 
another State to which the company has moved its actual centre of 
administration, where, under the law of that second State, the company may 
no longer bring legal proceedings there in respect of claims under a 
contract? 
Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 21. 
 121. The court asked:   “Does the freedom of establishment of companies (Articles 
43 EC and 48 EC) require that a company’s legal capacity and capacity to be a party 
to legal proceedings is to be determined according to the law of the State where the 
company is incorporated?”  Id. 
 122. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3 (analyzing the ECJ’s findings 
regarding whether a restriction on the freedom of establishment had occurred in the 
Überseering case and whether a justification for the restriction existed). 
 123. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 124. See EC TREATY art. 234 (establishing that Member States may request a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ when such a ruling is necessary in order for them to 
render a judgment); supra note 119 and accompanying text; see also ARNULL, supra 
note 66, at 264 (observing that allowing the national courts of Member States to seek 
preliminary rulings from the ECJ under Article 234 is essential to the proper 
functioning of the common market because it ensures that EU law will be 
interpreted and applied the same way in all Member States).  Since 1989, the Court 
of First Instance of the European Communities has been interpreting European 
Community law, a task originally performed solely by the ECJ.  Id. at 191.  
Interpreting European Community law is complicated by the “multilingual nature of 
European Community law.”  Id. at 198.  Thus, “‘[t]he interpretation of Community 
instruments involves very often not the process familiar to common lawyers of 
laboriously extracting the meaning from words used but the more creative process of 
applying flesh to a spare and loosely constructed skeleton.’”  Id. (quoting 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Samex ApS, 3 C.M.L.R. 194, 211 (Q.B.D. 
Comm. Ct. 1983) (U.K.)). 
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three-step analysis.  First, it addressed the question of whether the 
Treaty provisions concerning the freedom of establishment applied 
in the Überseering case.125  Second, the ECJ analyzed whether a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment had occurred.126  Third, 
the Court inquired whether a justification existed for that 
restriction.127  The ECJ ultimately held that the Treaty provisions on 
the freedom of establishment require host states to recognize the 
legal capacity of a company and allow it access to the national courts, 
where the company is incorporated in one EU Member State and 
moves its center of administration to another Member State.128 
1. The Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment apply 
Regarding the applicability of the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment, the ECJ properly found that they cover a host 
country’s legal treatment of a foreign corporation.129  In their 
submissions to the Court, Nordic Construction and the governments 
of Germany, Spain, and Italy argued that the real seat doctrine is 
compatible with the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment, 
even if it leads to the denial of the legal capacity of a foreign 
corporation.130  By contrast, Überseering BV, the governments of the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom, the Commission, and the 
                                                          
 125. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 52-77 (determining that a foreign corporation 
may rely on the freedom of establishment, which is ensured under the EC Treaty, to 
challenge a Member State’s refusal to recognize its legal capacity).  The Court also 
pointed out that the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital would apply 
to a person’s acquisition of shares in a foreign corporation.  Id. ¶ 77.  By contrast, the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment apply when that person acquires all 
shares in a company that is incorporated in another Member State and when that 
person can then determine the company’s activities.  Id. 
 126. See id. ¶¶ 78-82 (finding that the application of the German seat theory had 
indeed resulted in a restriction of the freedom of establishment).  The Court also 
noted that requiring a foreign company to reincorporate in Germany once it had 
moved its place of administration there constitutes an “outright negation of freedom 
of establishment.”  Id. ¶ 81. 
 127. See id. ¶¶ 83-92 (examining whether the restriction on the freedom of 
establishment was justified by its lack of discrimination, its proportionality, and its 
important role in achieving public policy goals). 
 128. See id. ¶¶ 94-95 (finding a host state’s nonrecognition of a foreign-
incorporated company’s legal capacity to be incompatible with the Treaty provisions 
on freedom of establishment). 
 129. See id. ¶ 52 (declaring that a company validly incorporated in one Member 
State which is deemed by a second Member State to have moved its seat to the 
second state is still covered by the Treaty provisions regarding the freedom of 
establishment). 
 130. See id. ¶ 23-35 (summarizing the argument of Nordic Construction and the 
German, Spanish, and Italian governments that the freedom of establishment 
provisions do not prevent the laws of the host state from determining the legal 
capacity of a company that is incorporated elsewhere and moves its real seat to the 
host state). 
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European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”)131 Surveillance Authority 
took the position that Articles 43 and 48, taken together, preclude 
the host state from determining the legal capacity of a company 
according to its laws.132 
Nordic Construction, Germany, Spain, and Italy based their 
arguments in part on Article 293 of the EC Treaty, which provides in 
relevant part: 
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations 
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their 
nationals . . . the mutual recognition of companies or firms within 
the meaning of . . . Article 48, [and] the retention of legal 
personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country 
to another. . . .133 
The government of Italy noted that Article 293 specifically states that 
negotiations between states should be the mechanism for 
determining how corporate personhood is retained upon seat 
transfers across boundaries.134  According to the Commission, 
however, the requirement under Article 293 that “Member States 
shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations” has been made 
unnecessary by the body of ECJ case law that has developed since the 
signing of that Article in 1968.135 
                                                          
 131. See PHILLIP RAWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 3 (2001) (detailing the functions and history of the EFTA).  The EFTA was 
first established by the United Kingdom as a rival trade grouping to the European 
Economic Community in 1960.  Id.  It allowed those states that did not wish to join 
the European Community to establish their own free trade zone.  See ARNULL, supra 
note 66, at 9-10. 
 132. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 36-51 (setting forth the main arguments of 
Überseering BV, the governments of the Netherlands and United Kingdom, the 
Commission, and the EFTA Surveillance Authority). 
 133. EC TREATY art. 293; see Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 24. 
 134. Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 27.  Spain commented that the Convention on the 
Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons was signed in 1968, but never 
entered into force.  Id. ¶ 28.  Therefore, Article 293 has not been fulfilled by 
negotiations, and articles 43 and 48 are silent as to the relevant questions.  Id.  Thus, 
Spain argued that there is no real consensus among Member States as to what are the 
legal ramifications for a company that moves its seat.  Id.  Similarly, Nordic 
Construction submitted that no freedom of establishment violations had occurred 
because the articles envision negotiations between Member States to set up a 
framework of mutual recognition of companies, which has not yet occurred.  See id. 
¶ 25.  Moreover, companies are still free to either reincorporate themselves or 
establish a presence in a host state as long as their largest center of administration 
and their place of incorporation remain in the same state.  Id.  Germany argued that 
Articles 43 and 48 were written to allow national control over corporate law until the 
accomplishment of legal harmonization.  Id. ¶ 26.  Because harmonization has not 
yet occurred, the argument continues, German real seat practice and its implications 
for the legal capacity of corporations are legal under the EC Treaty.  Id. 
 135. See id. ¶ 37 (recounting the Commission’s contrary interpretation of Article 
293). 
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In its findings, the ECJ disagreed with the arguments of Nordic 
Construction and its supporting governments and stated that the laws 
which the host state applies to a foreign-incorporated company fall 
within the freedom of establishment provisions.136  The Court 
specifically rejected the arguments concerning Article 293 of the EC 
Treaty because Articles 43 and 48 by themselves allow companies to 
exercise their freedom of establishment.137  Entities cannot exercise 
that right of establishment if host states will not recognize them as 
companies.138 
Nordic Construction and its supporting governments also cited 
Daily Mail to support their proposition.139  In Daily Mail, the ECJ 
indicated that whether and how a seat transfer may happen is “not 
resolved by the rules concerning the right of establishment but must 
be dealt with by future legislation or conventions.”140  Überseering BV 
and its supporting governments and institutions, on the other hand, 
argued that Daily Mail is inapplicable because in that case the ECJ 
only ruled on the effect of a real seat transfer in the state of 
incorporation rather than in the host state.141  Instead, they saw 
greater applicability in the ECJ’s ruling in Centros because it dealt with 
the law of the host state.142 
                                                          
 136. See id. ¶ 52 (finding that the freedom of establishment provisions cover a host 
state’s application of its laws to a company that is incorporated in another EU 
Member State and has transferred its center of administration to the host country). 
 137. See id. ¶¶ 53-60 (rejecting the argument that Article 293 requires negotiations 
between states or the adoption of a convention to be the basis for mutual recognition 
of companies that transfer seats to other Member States). 
 138. See id. ¶ 59 (characterizing host states’ recognition of companies as “[a] 
necessary precondition for the exercise of the freedom of establishment”). 
 139. See id. ¶ 29 (citing Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury & Comm’rs of 
Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail & General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5512, 
¶¶ 23-24, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713, 726 (1988)). 
 140. Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 29 (quoting Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5512, ¶ 23-
24, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 726).  Germany argued that Daily Mail applied to the facts of 
Überseering even though the controversy in Daily Mail was between a company and its 
state of incorporation rather than with its host state.  Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 30. 
 141. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 38-39 (discussing the attempt by Überseering 
BV, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Commission, and the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority to distinguish Daily Mail from the facts in Überseering).  They 
argued that Daily Mail states that companies are creatures of national law and thus 
may be regulated by their state of incorporation.  Id. ¶ 40.  However, the ECJ did not 
determine in that case whether a company must be regulated or recognized in a 
second state.  Id. 
 142. See id. ¶¶ 41-43.  In Centros, the ECJ decided that the host state must allow a 
company incorporated in another Member State to freely establish a branch in the 
host country even when it is clear that the company would conduct the majority of its 
business in the host country and that the parent corporation is merely a legal strategy 
to avoid the laws of the host country.  Id. ¶¶ 42-43. 
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The ECJ addressed these two contrary interpretations of its earlier 
ruling in Daily Mail.143  Again, the Court agreed with the submissions 
of Überseering BV and its supporting governments and institutions 
and held that Daily Mail is distinct from Überseering.144  The ECJ stated 
that Daily Mail did not deal with the question of whether a host state 
is able to deny legal capacity to a company that is incorporated in one 
EU Member State and has moved its seat to the host state.145  Thus, 
the Court reasoned that Daily Mail did not provide guidance for the 
Überseering case, where the Court would have to decide whether a host 
state has the right to deny a company’s legal capacity upon that 
entity’s seat transfer to the host state.146  The ECJ concluded that 
Überseering BV could base its arguments on Articles 43 and 48, 
which guarantee the right of establishment.147 
2. A restriction on the freedom of establishment occurred 
Once the Court determined that the Treaty provisions on freedom 
of establishment applied to the Überseering case, it examined whether 
Germany violated those principles by refusing to recognize 
Überseering BV’s legal capacity.148  The Court’s reasoning centered 
on the realization that German law forces a foreign-incorporated 
company that has moved its center of administration to Germany to 
reincorporate in Germany if it seeks to file a legal action there.149  The 
ECJ focused heavily on the implications of that reincorporation 
requirement.150  The Court seemed to imply that the right of 
establishment becomes meaningless if the company does not enjoy 
legal recognition and the ability to bring court actions in the host 
                                                          
 143. See id. ¶¶ 61-73. 
 144. See id. ¶¶ 62-71 (observing that Daily Mail addressed the relationship between 
companies and their states of incorporation when the companies transfer their 
administrative centers to another state, while Überseering addressed the relationship 
between companies and their host states). 
 145. See id. ¶¶ 70-71 (distinguishing the limited holding of the Daily Mail decision 
from the questions presented in Überseering).  The ECJ stated that the Daily Mail case 
only determined that a company’s state of incorporation may restrict that company’s 
ability to move its management seat abroad.  Id. ¶ 70. 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 71-72. 
 147. See id. ¶¶ 76-77 (finding that the application of the German real seat doctrine 
and resulting denial of Überseering BV’s legal capacity fall within the scope of the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment). 
 148. See id. ¶¶ 52-77. 
 149. See id. ¶ 79 (“[A] company validly incorporated under the law of . . . a 
Member State other than . . . Germany has under German law no alternative to 
reincorporation in Germany if it wishes to enforce before a German court its rights 
under a contract entered into with a company incorporated under German law.”). 
 150. See id. ¶¶ 79, 81-82 (discussing the negative ramifications that the denial of a 
foreign-incorporated company’s legal capacity and ability to bring legal proceedings 
will have on the freedom of establishment). 
ROTHE.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/3/2004  6:01 PM 
1128 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1103 
state.151  In fact, the host state’s recognition of the company’s legal 
capacity is a necessary precondition to the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment.152  Without legal recognition and, particularly, the 
ability to bring legal proceedings, the formation of a secondary or 
primary establishment lacks a legal basis.153  Based on this insightful 
observation, the Court correctly reasoned that the denial of a 
company’s legal capacity, which resulted from the application of the 
German seat theory, constituted a negation of the freedom of 
establishment.154 
To support its finding, the ECJ pointed out that Überseering BV 
did not lose its standing as an entity incorporated in the Netherlands 
when two German nationals acquired all shares of the company.155  
Further, the Court relied on its ruling in Daily Mail to contend that “a 
company exists only by virtue of the national legislation which 
determines its incorporation and functioning.”156  The Court noted 
that Überseering BV had the right to exercise its freedom of 
establishment under the EC Treaty.157  Thus, the ECJ concluded that 
Germany’s refusal to recognize Überseering BV’s legal capacity and 
denial of court access were inconsistent with the Treaty provisions on 
freedom of establishment.158 
3. The restriction on the freedom of establishment was not justified 
Perhaps the greatest significance of the Überseering case lies in the 
ECJ’s discussion of the possible justifications for a restriction on the 
right of establishment.  While finding the non-recognition of a 
                                                          
 151. See id. ¶¶ 78-82 (observing that Überseering BV existed as a company under 
Netherlands law and that Germany’s requirement that it reincorporate in Germany 
upon moving its seat to the country constituted a negation of Überseering BV’s 
freedom of establishment). 
 152. See Elisabeth M. Mayr, Überseering:  Das Ende der Sitztheorie?, at http://www.jura-
lotse.de/newsletter/nl57-003.shtml (Sept. 19, 1999) (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (stating that the freedom of establishment requires legal 
recognition by all EU Member States where the entity may wish to exercise its right of 
establishment). 
 153. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 81 (“The requirement of reincorporation . . . 
is . . . tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment.”). 
 154. See id. ¶¶ 80-81. 
 155. See id. (claiming that Überseering BV has the right to exercise its freedom of 
establishment because “its very existence is inseparable from its status as a company 
incorporated under Netherlands law” and that it did not lose its legal personhood in 
the Netherlands even when German citizens purchased all of its shares). 
 156. Id. ¶ 81. 
 157. See id. ¶ 80 (stating that Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty entitle a company 
incorporated in one EU Member State to exercise its freedom of establishment in 
another Member State). 
 158. See id. ¶ 82 (declaring that the denial of access to the host country’s legal 
system after a foreign-incorporated entity moves its center of administration to the 
host country constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment). 
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foreign-incorporated company to be an excessive measure, the Court 
acknowledged a host state’s interest in regulating entities based 
within its territory.159 
Under certain circumstances, a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment may be justified.160  The German government argued 
that the restrictive measures at issue in Überseering were covered by the 
public interest exception.161  The ECJ had previously established four 
conditions which a restriction on the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom must fulfill in order to be justified on public interest 
grounds.162  First, the restrictive measure must not discriminate.163  
Second, an overriding consideration of the public interest must 
justify the restriction.164  Third, the rules must be appropriate for 
achieving the stated objective.165  Lastly, the restriction must not 
exceed the measures that are necessary to achieve the objective.166 
Regarding the non-discriminatory application of the restrictive 
measure, Germany maintained that the consequences of the real seat 
doctrine apply both to foreign-incorporated entities that have their 
place of administration in Germany and to companies incorporated 
in Germany that move their center of administration abroad.167  With 
respect to the requirement that the restriction be justified by 
superseding requirements of the public interest, the German 
Government pointed out several aspects of the real seat doctrine that 
                                                          
 159. See id. ¶ 92 (noting that the protection of the interests of creditors, minority 
shareholders, employees, and taxation authorities could in some instances justify 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment). 
 160. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 83, at 147-48 (summarizing the exceptions to the 
right of establishment pursuant to articles 45 (official authority exception), 46 
(public policy, public service, and public health exception), and 30 (public interest 
exception) of the EC Treaty). 
 161. See EC TREATY art. 46 (allowing Member States to impose limited restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment for public policy reasons); Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. 
¶ 84 (reciting the German government’s argument that the restriction does not 
violate the EC Treaty because it “applies without discrimination, is justified by 
overriding requirements relating to the general interest and is proportionate to the 
objectives pursued”). 
 162. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio, 1995 E.C.R. I-4165, I-4197-98, ¶ 37, 
[1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 628 (1995) (listing the four conditions that must be satisfied 
to justify any national measure that potentially hinders the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the EC treaty). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 85 (relating Germany’s contention that the real seat 
doctrine applies to foreign and native corporations alike), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumoc
&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 2002). 
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are consistent with public interest considerations.168  First, Germany 
claimed that EU law has previously acknowledged the value of having 
a company’s center of administration coincide with its state of 
incorporation.169  Further, the German Government argued that the 
German seat theory promotes legal certainty and creditor 
protection.170  The government of Germany particularly stressed the 
fact that the EU Member States have not yet harmonized their laws 
regarding minimum capital requirements for limited liability 
companies.171  Moreover, the German Government alerted the Court 
to the protection of minority shareholders, employees, and joint 
management that a uniform application of German law guarantees.172  
It expressed concern about the possibility of circumventing these 
rules by simply incorporating in another Member State.173  Lastly, 
Germany claimed that fiscal reasons also justified a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment in the present case.174 
The Court found that no justification exists for a host state’s 
complete denial of the legal capacity of a company that is validly 
incorporated in one EU Member State and moves its seat to the host 
country.175  However, the ECJ did not entirely dismiss Germany’s 
public interest arguments and specifically stated that “overriding 
requirements relating to the general interest, such as the protection 
                                                          
 168. See id. ¶¶ 86-90. 
 169. See id. ¶ 86 (recounting the German Government’s contention that other 
areas of EC law have “recognized the merits, in principle, of a single registered and 
administrative office” by assuming that such offices are one and the same). 
 170. See id. ¶ 87 (relaying Germany’s arguments that a uniform application of 
Germany’s private international company law to all companies whose principal place 
of business is in Germany will create uniform legal requirements and will give 
creditors and other contracting parties greater protection than they typically receive 
from Member States with less stringent requirements). 
 171. See id. (conveying Germany’s concern that contract parties and creditors of 
limited liability companies receive less protection from some Member States that 
have significantly lower standards). 
 172. See id. ¶¶ 88-89 (describing the German Government’s view that the German 
seat theory serves the public interest by precluding companies with their principal 
place of business in Germany from circumventing the national company formation 
requirements). 
 173. See id. ¶ 89 (summarizing Germany’s contention that incorporation under 
the laws of another Member State could allow a company in Germany to avoid 
German company laws, including provisions regarding employee rights). 
 174. See id. ¶ 90 (explaining that the state-of-incorporation theory permits 
companies to enjoy concurrent tax advantages in all of their places of residence); see 
also Anno Rainer et al., Compensation for ACT not Offset by Entitlement to Tax Credits, 
INT’L TAX REV., Feb. 2003, at 43 (forecasting that the ECJ’s holding in Überseering, 
requiring host states to recognize foreign-incorporated entities, will provide “tax 
planning opportunities for the use of dual resident companies in Europe”), available 
at http://www.legalmediagroup.com/internationaltaxreview/default.asp?Page=3&cI 
ndex=20&SID=2357&M=2&Y=2003. 
 175. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 93 (finding that a complete denial of legal 
capacity contradicts companies’ guaranteed freedom of establishment). 
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of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and 
even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and 
subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of 
establishment.”176 
When analyzing the ECJ’s finding, it is important to bear in mind 
that the application of the German seat theory infringed on a 
company’s fundamental right to remedies and essentially resulted in 
the complete negation of the company’s freedom of establishment.177  
The denial of a company’s legal capacity and ability to bring legal 
proceedings constitutes an excessive measure to achieve the objective 
of protecting the host country’s legal, economic, and social values.178  
A host country can protect the interests of creditors, minority 
shareholders, and employees through less restrictive means, such as 
the imposition of minimum requirements for conducting business in 
the host state.179  Based on the Court’s reasoning, it seems entirely 
possible that the ECJ may decide a future case more favorably for the 
real seat doctrine if it involves an attempt by a host country to impose 
its corporate regulations on the foreign company without denying 
the company’s legal capacity.180  The Court may find such regulations 
                                                          
 176. Id. ¶ 92.  The ECJ has not defined what may amount to an overriding 
requirement of the public interest but makes such determinations on a case-by-case 
basis.  Dammann, supra note 48, at 651-52.  In the past, the Court has found the 
following goals to constitute such imperative requirements:  controlling unfair 
market practices, effectively supervising financial concerns, protecting consumers, 
and safeguarding media diversity.  See id. at 652-54 (observing that the ECJ’s prior 
findings do not constitute an exhaustive list). 
 177. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the ECJ’s finding that the freedom 
of establishment lacks meaning when a law forces a foreign-incorporated company to 
reincorporate in order to receive legal recognition). 
 178. See VANOVAC, supra note 105 (asserting that the non-recognition of a foreign-
incorporated entity is not merely a restriction on the freedom of establishment but 
constitutes an illegitimate negation of that right); see also Mayr, supra note 152 
(commenting that the objective of protecting the rights of creditors and employees 
cannot justify the denial of a company’s legal capacity and ability to bring legal 
proceedings). 
 179. See Dammann, supra note 48, at 623 (claiming that the imposition of 
Germany’s codetermination provisions, unlike the Danish measures at issue in 
Centros, would not result in the negation of a company’s right of establishment but 
would merely allow the host state to control the internal affairs of companies that 
conduct business in its territory); see also Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og 
Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1484, I-1496, ¶ 37, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 587 (1999) 
(theorizing that a host country can protect creditors through less restrictive means 
than the refusal to register a branch of a foreign-incorporated company).  In Centros, 
the Court noted that Denmark could have passed legislation to provide public 
creditors with the needed guarantees from the company, thus implying that such a 
measure would not violate the freedom of establishment provisions.  Id. 
 180. See supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also Mayr, supra note 152 
(declaring that under the ECJ ruling in Überseering, important considerations of the 
public interest may justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment under 
certain circumstances); VANOVAC, supra note 105 (inferring from the ECJ ruling in 
Überseering that overriding concerns regarding the public interest could justify a 
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to constitute a legitimate restriction on the freedom of establishment, 
provided the regulations do not result in an outright negation of the 
right.181 
4. Assessment of the ECJ’s overall holding 
The ECJ ultimately held that when a company incorporated in one 
EU Member State moves its place of administration to another 
Member State, then the host country must recognize the company’s 
legal capacity and allow it access to the host country’s courts.182  In 
answering the first certified question, the Court found that Articles 43 
and 48 preclude the host state from refusing to recognize the legal 
capacity of such a company and denying the company court access in 
the host country.183  In answering the second question, the ECJ stated 
that the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment require the 
host state to recognize a foreign-incorporated company’s legal 
capacity and to grant that company access to its courts.184 
Interestingly, the ECJ’s preliminary ruling in Überseering did not 
directly respond to the questions that the German Federal Court of 
Justice referred to it.185  The German court asked the ECJ to decide 
whether the freedom of establishment provisions preclude a 
determination of a company’s legal capacity under the laws of the 
seat state.186  The court also asked whether the relevant Treaty 
provisions require a determination of a company’s legal capacity 
based on the laws of the incorporation state.187  In essence, the 
German Federal Court of Justice sought guidance on the ECJ’s 
preference for the real seat doctrine or state-of-incorporation 
theory.188  However, the ECJ’s holdings do not directly correspond to 
                                                          
limitation on a company’s right of establishment). 
 181. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (acknowledging the possibility of 
valid partial restrictions on the right of establishment); see also Überseering, 2002 
E.C.R. ¶ 92-93 (conceding that strong public interest objectives might justify a host 
country’s restriction of a foreign-incorporated company’s freedom of establishment, 
but maintaining that such considerations do not justify a complete repudiation of the 
right). 
 182. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 94-95 (holding that a host state’s denial of the 
legal capacity of a foreign-incorporated entity is incompatible with the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom of establishment). 
 183. Id. ¶ 94. 
 184. Id. ¶ 95. 
 185. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 21 (reciting the first question that the German 
Federal Court of Justice certified to the ECJ). 
 187. See id. (reciting the second question that the German Federal Court of Justice 
certified to the ECJ). 
 188. See Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (remarking that the Centros decision did not 
state whether the state-of-incorporation theory or the real seat theory should govern 
conflict-of-laws questions in the European Union and that the German Federal Court 
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the German court’s questions.  The ECJ did not directly express a 
preference for the real seat theory or the incorporation theory.189  
Instead, the ECJ simply stated that host states may not deny a foreign 
company legal capacity and that the freedom of establishment 
provisions, in fact, require host states to recognize the legal capacity 
of foreign entities.190  While the ECJ has the liberty to rephrase a 
national court’s question to make it compliant with its mandate, the 
Court’s evasion of the choice between the real seat doctrine and 
incorporation theory was arguably intentional.  The ECJ may have 
sought to pressure EU Member States to reach an agreement 
regarding the preferred doctrine. 
The ECJ correctly concluded that the German requirement of 
reincorporation constituted an illegitimate restriction on the 
freedom of establishment.191  It would have been helpful, however, if 
the Court had expressed more clearly what type of overriding 
requirements of the public interest could sufficiently justify a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment.192  In the absence of 
clear guidance, legal uncertainty will continue to exist until the ECJ 
rules on a future case that tests the limits of the public interest 
exception.193  The extent to which a host state can impose regulatory 
protections on a foreign corporation, short of completely negating 
the corporation’s freedom of establishment, remains to be seen.194 
                                                          
of Justice expected the ECJ to address in the Überseering case which of the two 
competing conflict-of-laws principles it preferred). 
 189. See id. ¶¶ 94-95 (holding that the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment mandate the recognition of the legal capacity of a foreign-
incorporated company but failing to state a preference for a conflict-of-laws theory). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3 (analyzing the ECJ’s findings 
regarding whether a restriction on the freedom of establishment had occurred in the 
Überseering case and whether a justification existed for the restriction). 
 192. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 92 (stating merely that imperative requirements 
of the public interest may “in certain circumstances and subject to certain 
conditions” constitute a justification for a restriction of the right of establishment); 
see also Dammann, supra note 48, at 651-52 (discussing the ECJ’s failure to provide 
clear guidance regarding the public interest exception). 
 193. See Steinbeis, supra note 5 (noting that currently the uncertainty continues 
regarding the extent of the public interest exception and pointing out that the case 
law must define its boundaries); see also Brandner, supra note 68 (explaining that 
national law must fill the gaps of the Überseering ruling). 
 194. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (acknowledging the legal questions 
that remain unanswered following the Überseering ruling); Brandner, supra note 68 
(suggesting that compelling public interest grounds may justify a restriction of the 
freedom of establishment). 
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III. IMPACT OF THE ÜBERSEERING CASE 
The ECJ’s decision in Überseering significantly alters German 
international company law as well as the company law of several other 
EU Member States.195  While the ECJ’s ruling in Überseering doubtlessly 
weakened the real seat doctrine,196 two contrary interpretations are 
possible that would impute a different impact on the seat theory.197  
Under a broad interpretation of the Court’s ruling, Überseering could 
be seen as abolishing the real seat doctrine and adopting the 
incorporation theory.198  This Note argues, however, that the more 
reasonable interpretation is a narrow one that merely modifies the 
real seat doctrine to ensure legal recognition of foreign-incorporated 
companies.199  While the Überseering decision demands that a host state 
recognize the legal capacity of a foreign corporation, it does not 
require that all other internal affairs of the company be regulated 
with reference to the laws of the incorporation state.200  In fact, the 
ECJ’s ruling does not state anything about which countries’ laws will 
apply after that initial recognition.  The Court left open the question 
of whether the laws of the incorporation state or the seat state should 
exercise regulatory and enforcement control over such companies.201  
                                                          
 195. See Holst, supra note 48, at 323 (stating that various EU Member States that 
follow the real seat doctrine require companies to reincorporate under the host 
state’s laws as a prerequisite to legal recognition if they move their central 
management there). 
 196. See DR. GÖTZ-SEBASTIAN HÖK, KANZLEI DR. HÖK, STIEGLMEIER & KOLLEGEN, ZUR 
RECHTSENTWICKLUNG NACH DER LIBERALISIERUNG DER AUSLANDSGRÜNDUNGEN DURCH 
DIE ÜBERSEERING-ENTSCHEIDUNG DES EUGH IN DEUTSCHLAND, at http://www.dr-
hoek.de/Auslandsgruendung-Ueberseering-Entscheidung-EuGH-Deutschland.html 
(last updated May 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review) (arguing 
that a generalization of the ECJ’s reasoning in Überseering leads to a significant 
curtailment of the application of the real seat doctrine). 
 197. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (outlining broad and narrow 
interpretations of the ECJ’s Überseering ruling). 
 198. See, e.g., Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (claiming that the ECJ adopted the 
incorporation theory in its Überseering decision); see also HÖK, supra note 196 
(suggesting that the ECJ’s Überseering ruling constitutes the beginning of the end of 
the real seat doctrine). 
 199. See, e.g., Mayr, supra note 152 (advocating that the ECJ did not intend to 
abolish the real seat doctrine and adopt the incorporation theory in its Überseering 
ruling). 
 200. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 95 (requiring merely that host states recognize the 
legal capacity of foreign-incorporated entities and grant them access to the national 
courts), available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus! 
prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 2002). 
 201. See Mayr, supra note 152 (theorizing that it remains unsettled whether the law 
of the seat state or the law of the state of incorporation should govern a corporation 
once the host state has recognized its legal capacity); see also Kersting, supra note 43, 
at 40 (arguing that the Court’s holding that host states must recognize the legal 
capacity of foreign corporations does not automatically abolish the real seat 
doctrine); VANOVAC, supra note 105 (declaring that in neither Centros nor Überseering 
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Thus, the Überseering ruling could reasonably be interpreted as 
holding that the real seat doctrine is compatible with the treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment as long as its application does 
not lead to the denial of a company’s legal capacity. 
Regardless of the debate over the continued existence of the real 
seat doctrine, the Überseering ruling allows promoters a greater choice 
of law and paves the way to the mutual recognition of companies 
among EU Member States.202  The ECJ has required that host states 
recognize the legal capacity of companies that have their place of 
management in that state but are incorporated elsewhere and grant 
those companies access to the local courts.203  This means that 
companies may incorporate in one EU Member State while intending 
to conduct their business exclusively in another Member State that 
must now recognize the entity’s legal capacity.204  This development 
                                                          
did the ECJ determine if and to what extent the law of the incorporation state or seat 
state applies to the legal circumstances of a company, such as creditor protection).  
This interpretation also corresponds to the Opinion of the Advocate General, who 
advised the Court to focus on the denial of legal capacity and access to courts that 
Überseering BV faced under German law.  See Opinion of the Advocate General 
Colomer, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 
E.C.R. I-9919 (on file with the American University Law Review).  Implied in this 
statement is the suggestion to refrain from making a general ruling on the legitimacy 
of the real seat doctrine as a conflict-of-laws principle.  Instead, the Court was to limit 
its analysis to the legality of a host state’s non-recognition of a foreign company, 
which had ultimately resulted from the application of the real seat doctrine in the 
particular case.  Id. 
 202. See, e.g., Heine, supra note 48, at 102 (predicting that the Überseering decision 
will result in the “mutual recognition of national business forms” within the 
European Union); see also Roger Frick, Consolidating the Developments in Liechtenstein as 
Member State of EEA (European Economic Area)—Allgemeines Treuunternehmen 
(Allgemeines Treuunternehmen, Liechtenstein), Apr. 25, 2003, at 3 (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (concluding that the ECJ’s attitude reflects a firm 
backing of the free movement of capital and persons within the European Union, 
which encourages EU Member States to recognize one another’s business entities).  
The ECJ’s ruling in Überseering does not apply to companies incorporated outside of 
the European Union that have a seat in an EU Member State, because the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment only benefit companies incorporated and 
based within the European Union.  See Herrmann, supra note 65, at 44; cf. Peter C. 
Fischer & Brian T. Hemphill, Citizens of the World? New German Rules on Corporate 
Citizenship for U.S. Corporations, 32 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L LAW & PRACTICE 22 (2003) 
(discussing a recent ruling by the German Federal Court of Justice that requires 
German courts to recognize the legal capacity of a company that was incorporated in 
the United States but has its main seat in Germany). 
 203. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 95 (declaring that the Treaty provisions on 
freedom of establishment require the recognition of a company’s legal capacity by 
the host state). 
 204. See HÖK, supra note 196 (setting forth that the establishment of pseudo-
foreign corporations is legitimate after the Überseering ruling); see also Steinbeis, supra 
note 5 (arguing that the ECJ’s Überseering ruling will make it easier for promoters to 
circumvent the costs of establishing a limited liability company in Germany because 
German courts will now have to recognize such cheap limited liability companies 
(“Billig-GmbHs”) that have been formed according to less stringent regulations in 
other EU Member States).  See generally Kersting, supra note 43, at 1 (explaining that 
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raises the possibility of a race to the bottom, where promoters seek to 
incorporate in the EU Member State with the least stringent 
corporate laws while intending to conduct their business elsewhere.205  
In turn, this may lead to “regulatory competition” among EU 
Member States regarding their respective company laws.206 
Due to this potential trend towards a race to the bottom, the ECJ’s 
Überseering ruling may, in fact, produce a greater incentive for 
Member States to work towards legal harmonization in the area of 
company law by agreeing to a set of minimum standards.207  While the 
EU Member States have pursued legal harmonization in some areas, 
neither primary nor secondary EU law contains harmonized 
legislation on corporations.208  In fact, significant discrepancies persist 
between the company laws of different Member States.209  For 
                                                          
pseudo-foreign corporations do not have a significant relationship with their state of 
incorporation).  Pseudo-foreign corporations make it more difficult to ascertain the 
applicable law and to protect shareholders, and they generally interfere with a state’s 
interest in regulating companies.  Id. 
 205. See, e.g., Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (anticipating regulatory competition 
between the corporate laws of EU Member States as a result of the Überseering ruling 
because companies will want to incorporate under the most suitable company law 
standards); cf. Kersting, supra note 43, at 39 (suggesting that the real seat doctrine 
counteracts the attempt by pseudo-foreign corporations to circumvent the corporate 
laws of the country where they carry on the majority of their business). 
 206. See Heine, supra note 48, at 102 (explaining that regulatory competition 
between Member States with respect to company laws may increase as a result of the 
Überseering decision).  While proponents of regulatory competition predict a welfare-
enhancing race to the top of legal standards (“California Effect”), opponents fear a 
race to the bottom similar to the “Delaware Effect” in the United States.  Id. at 104-
05.  Viewing law as a product, the former school of thought believes that regulatory 
competition would increase the quality and efficiency of corporate laws.  Id. at 104.  
By contrast, opponents of regulatory competition believe that certain market failures 
would prevent a race to the top and instead reduce the quality of corporate laws.  Id. 
at 104-05.  The rationale is that companies would seek the corporate regulations with 
the best cost-quality ratio, which would eventually lead jurisdictions to offer 
corporate laws with ever-lower prices without the incentive to increase the quality of 
the rules.  Id.  In Europe, the prevalent view seems to be that regulatory competition 
has detrimental effects, while most American scholars believe that it works to the 
advantage of shareholders.  Kersting, supra note 43, at 11-12.  In general, those who 
believe that regulatory competition leads to a race to the top will favor the 
incorporation theory, while those who believe that it leads to a race to the bottom 
will support the real seat doctrine.  Heine, supra note 48, at 106. 
 207. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 208. See Holst, supra note 48, at 338 (describing the European Union’s history of 
failed attempts at legal harmonization of company laws, including the Convention on 
the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 
which both the Netherlands and United Kingdom declined to ratify); see also ARNULL, 
supra note 66, at 469 (noting that Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty is intended to 
promote harmonization and has been the basis for the adoption of some directives).  
See generally Christoph U. Schmid, Pattern of Legislative and Adjudicative Integration of 
Private Law, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 415, 417-83 (2002) (surveying legislative and 
adjudicative integration in the European Union). 
 209. See Garza, supra note 48, at 77 (arguing that the variation among EU Member 
States’ company laws creates confusion and uncertainty for corporations); see also 
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example, Germany’s rules on the establishment of corporations are 
substantially more restrictive than the laws in other Member States, 
such as the United Kingdom.210  Harmonized legislation regarding 
corporate rules would weaken a company’s incentive to circumvent 
national rules by incorporating elsewhere and, thus, diminish the 
roles of the real seat doctrine and incorporation theory as competing 
approaches to conflict-of-laws problems. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. EU Member States Should Amend Their Laws to Comply with                         
the ECJ Ruling 
To comply with the ECJ ruling in Überseering, EU Member States 
must review their international company laws and, if necessary, 
amend them to ensure legal recognition and access to courts for 
companies that have their seat in one Member State but are 
incorporated in another.211  In particular, Germany must eliminate its 
requirement of reincorporation that it imposed on foreign 
companies who moved their place of management to Germany and 
sought to bring legal proceedings there.212  Germany may seek to 
replace this reincorporation requirement with other methods of 
regulatory enforcement.  While the German Federal Court of Justice 
has already implemented the ECJ’s ruling in follow-up proceedings to 
the Überseering case,213 German law is not well-prepared for the 
implications of the liberalization of foreign incorporation that will 
                                                          
Steinbeis, supra note 5 (stating that German company law is stricter than that of 
other EU Member States). 
 210. See Steinbeis, supra note 5 (illustrating the dissimilarities of company law 
within the European Union by comparing the regulations on the incorporation of 
companies in Germany and England).  Promoters may form a limited liability 
company in England with a minimum capital of only £ 100, whereas they would need 
at least € 25,000 in Germany.  Id.  The higher minimum capital requirement in 
Germany is intended to guarantee greater creditor protection in exchange for 
liberating the company members from personal liability.  Id. 
 211. See Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 95 (requiring host states to recognize the legal capacity 
of companies that are incorporated in another EU Member State but move their seat 
to the host state and grant those entities access to the host state’s national courts), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod! 
CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 2002). 
 212. See id. ¶¶ 81-82 (rejecting the German requirement of reincorporation as 
inconsistent with the freedom of establishment under the EC Treaty). 
 213. See Judgment of March 13, 2003, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court 
of Justice) VII ZR 370/98, BGH ZIP 2003, 718; see also HÖK, supra note 196 (relating 
that the German Federal Court of Justice has given effect to the ECJ ruling in 
Überseering by declaring that the legal capacity of foreign entities must be recognized 
in Germany even if these companies have moved their place of administration to 
Germany). 
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occur in the aftermath of the Überseering ruling.214  German lawmakers 
must attempt to resolve open questions such as the personal liability 
of the company members and partners of a foreign-incorporated 
entity with its seat in Germany and the integration of such a company 
into a German limited partnership.215 
B. The ECJ Ruling in Überseering Should Be Interpreted Narrowly 
The holdings of the ECJ in the Überseering case cannot be construed 
as abolishing the real seat doctrine.216  Instead, the Überseering decision 
should be interpreted narrowly as modifying, but not abolishing, the 
real seat doctrine.217  Under a narrow interpretation, the Überseering 
ruling imposes on the host state the requirement of legal recognition 
of foreign-incorporated companies that have moved their centers of 
administration to that state.218  The ECJ only rejected Germany’s strict 
requirement of reincorporation.219  The ECJ did not, however, discuss 
which states’ law would apply to the internal structure of companies 
incorporated in one EU Member State and having their place of 
management in another.220  A narrow interpretation of the Überseering 
ruling is imperative to prevent the race to the bottom that would 
result from companies’ ability to circumvent the legal, economic, and 
social values of host states.221 
                                                          
 214. See HÖK, supra note 196 (proclaiming that the German legal system is not 
prepared for the implications of foreign incorporations). 
 215. See id. (detailing some of the open questions in German international 
company law after the Überseering decision).  German lawmakers also need to resolve 
issues concerning the ability of foreign-incorporated entities with a seat in Germany 
to be recorded in the land registry and register of companies.  Id. 
 216. See discussion supra Part III (presenting two contrary interpretations of the 
Überseering case and the respective impacts on the real seat doctrine); Kersting, supra 
note 43, at 40 (arguing that the Überseering decision does not abolish the real seat 
doctrine). 
 217. See discussion supra Part III (arguing that the more reasonable interpretation 
is that Überseering merely modifies the seat theory to ensure legal recognition of 
companies incorporated in other EU Member States). 
 218. See discussion supra Part III (explaining that under a narrow interpretation, 
the ECJ’s ruling demands a host state’s recognition of the legal capacity of a foreign 
corporation but does not require other internal affairs of the company to be 
regulated by the laws of the incorporation state). 
 219. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, ¶ 95, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_ 
doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62000J0208 (Nov. 5, 
2002). 
 220. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (showing that the ECJ limited its 
analysis to the legality of non-recognition of a foreign company and refrained from 
ruling generally on the applicability of the seat theory in conflict-of-laws situations). 
 221. See discussion supra Part III (arguing that a broader interpretation would 
allow companies to incorporate in EU Member States with less stringent laws while 
intending to conduct their business exclusively in another state in an effort to avoid 
more restrictive laws); see also supra notes 205-06 (explaining the concept of a race to 
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C. Even Under a Broad Interpretation, Host States May Require Compliance 
with Their Regulatory Protections 
If legal scholars largely interpret the Überseering ruling broadly, host 
states should be allowed to require companies doing business in their 
territory to follow basic standards of the host state’s company law.  
This would prevent companies from circumventing those regulations 
by incorporating in a country with less stringent rules.222  The ECJ’s 
decision leaves room for host states to impose their regulatory 
protections on those companies that have their principal place of 
business in the host state but are incorporated in another EU 
Member State.223  The ECJ stated that compelling considerations of 
the public interest may justify a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment.224  The protection of creditors, minority shareholders, 
and employees in Germany may qualify as such public interest 
considerations.225  National courts and the ECJ will have to determine 
what the limitations are of a host state’s ability to impose its 
regulatory framework.226  Presumably, the limit will be set where the 
                                                          
the bottom). 
 222. See Garza, supra note 48, at 82 (suggesting that a host state may be able to 
apply its company laws to those entities that have “substantial contacts” with that 
country, even if their place of incorporation is another EU Member State); Ebke, 
supra note 27, at 1016, 1029 (relating that some countries that adhere to the 
incorporation theory impose limitations on the application of the doctrine by 
requiring foreign-incorporated entities to follow the internal affairs rules of the state 
where they conduct most of their business). 
 223. See Steinbeis, supra note 5 (citing a legal scholar from Germany’s Bucerius 
Law School as saying that the ECJ left a door open for the welfare desire of German 
company law by conceding that overriding considerations of the public interest may 
justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment). 
 224. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 92-93 (giving examples of important public 
interest considerations that might justify a limited restriction on the freedom of 
establishment).  These justifications include the protection of creditor and minority 
shareholder interests as well as the interests of employees and taxation authorities.  
Id. ¶ 92.  The Court cautioned, however, that these interests will excuse restrictions 
on the right of establishment only “in certain circumstances and subject to certain 
conditions.”  Id.  Even with the goal of protecting these interests, the restrictive 
measures may never go so far as to deny a company’s legal capacity, because that 
would negate the right of establishment in its entirety.  Id. ¶ 93. 
 225. See Steinbeis, supra note 5 (inferring from the ECJ’s reasoning that German 
company law provisions that seek to protect creditors, minority shareholders, and 
employees may justify a restricted right of establishment); see also Dammann, supra 
note 48, at 685 (arguing that Germany could legitimately apply its rules on workers’ 
participation in management to pseudo-foreign corporations).  While the German 
provisions on codetermination constitute a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment, overriding requirements of the general interest would largely justify 
that restriction.  Id. at 685. 
 226. See Steinbeis, supra note 5 (relating that German case law will have to fill in 
the gaps of where the limits are of Germany’s ability to impose its regulatory 
protections short of negating the freedom of establishment).  Currently, legal 
uncertainty exists in this area.  Id. 
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imposition of these national regulations comes too close to an 
outright negation of the freedom of establishment.227 
D. The European Union Should Strive Towards Legal Harmonization to 
Diminish Conflict-of-Laws Problems 
More than anything, the ECJ ruling in Überseering increases the 
pressure on EU Member States to harmonize legislation in the area 
of company law.228  The potential for a race to the bottom in the 
aftermath of the Überseering decision may produce sufficient incentive 
for EU Member States to strive towards legal harmonization.229  
Member states should agree to a set of minimum standards that 
companies must follow when doing business in any EU Member State 
and establish those in EU law.230  This harmonization would diminish 
the roles of the real seat doctrine and incorporation theory as 
alternative approaches to conflict-of-laws problems, because the law 
of the seat country and the law of the state of incorporation would be 
largely equivalent.231 
                                                          
 227. See Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. ¶¶ 93-94 (finding that national measures which 
amount to a negation of the right of establishment are incompatible with the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom of establishment).  Of course, legitimate national 
measures would also have to meet the four-prong-test for the public interest 
exception.  See DAVIES, supra note 83, at 148 (“[T]he rules must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue; [and] they must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.”); 
Dammann, supra note 48, at 647-85 (outlining the imperative requirements doctrine 
and analyzing its use for justifying national rules on codetermination). 
 228. See Garza, supra note 48, at 82 (observing that a blow to the seat theory could 
revive the strive towards legal harmonization in EU company law) (citing John C. 
Coffee, Jr., European Takeovers:  The 13th Directive is Coming, 222 N.Y.L.J. 98 (Nov. 18, 
1999)). 
 229. See Heine, supra note 48, at 103 (anticipating regulatory competition between 
the corporate laws of the EU Member States); Holst, supra note 48, at 332, 338-40 
(proposing that legal harmonization would solve the race to the bottom problem). 
 230. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of legal 
harmonization in the European Union in the area of company law); see also Garza, 
supra note 48, at 77 (advocating the adoption of “uniform rules of corporate 
governance” in order to ensure stability and progress in the economic sphere).  See 
generally Schmid, supra note 208, at 416-17 (explaining that legal harmonization is 
achieved through directives, regulations, and ECJ rulings); Holst, supra note 48, at 
338-39 (outlining the advantages and disadvantages of harmonizing legislation in the 
area of company law).  For example, legal harmonization prevents the circumvention 
of national rules, but it may result in “high transaction costs.”  Id. (citing David 
Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules:  An 
American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities, 32 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 423, 436, 440 (1991)). 
 231. See Ebke, supra note 27, at 1037 (arguing that without harmonization of laws 
governing the internal affairs of EU corporations, competition for incorporation of 
businesses between EU Member States will be distorted); Schmid, supra note 208, at 
485 (arguing that the adoption of a “European Civil Code” akin to the United States 
Uniform Commercial Code would serve to integrate the divergent national laws that 
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Until the achievement of legal harmonization in the area of 
company law, the European Union should devise strategies to control 
abuses of the freedom of establishment provisions to circumvent 
national regulations for the formation of a company.232  Moreover, 
Member States should enter conventions about the mutual 
recognition of business forms and negotiate an approach to conflict-
of-laws problems.233  Another way of diminishing the roles of 
competing conflict-of-laws principles would be the establishment of 
an EU corporation, the Societas Europaea (“SE”), which would be a 
business form that promoters could incorporate on an EU level and 
operate throughout the European Union.234 
CONCLUSION 
The ECJ limited its ruling in the Überseering case to the requirement 
that host states recognize a foreign-incorporated entity’s legal 
capacity and grant it access to the local courts.  Accordingly, the 
decision should be interpreted narrowly as modifying the real seat 
doctrine to ensure legal recognition by host states.  Because the ECJ 
did not determine which states’ laws should apply beyond this initial 
recognition, the holding cannot be interpreted broadly as abolishing 
the seat theory and adopting the incorporation doctrine.  For now, 
the real seat doctrine continues to exist and must be deemed 
compatible with the freedom of establishment as long as it does not 
result in the denial of a foreign company’s legal capacity and access 
to the host state’s courts. 
 
                                                          
currently provide incentives for companies to abuse the freedom of establishment 
provisions). 
 232. See HÖK, supra note 196 (indicating that a legal basis for abuse control does 
not currently exist); M.CHETCUTI CAUCHI, CHETCUTI CAUCHI ADVOCATES, THE 
EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE:  FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE SOCIETAS EUROPAEA 
(May 2001), available at www.cc-advocates.com/publications/articles/freedom-of-
movement-european-company.htm (suggesting that some courts have ignored the 
corporate form and pierced the corporate veil to protect against abuse). 
 233. See ARNULL, supra note 66, at 469 (noting that the purpose of the Convention 
on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons is to reconcile the 
differences between the Member States’ rules regarding the recognition of foreign-
incorporated entities).  The European Union has not adopted this convention.  Id. 
 234. See MEDHURST, supra note 83, at 185-86 (examining the possibility of the 
formation of a European company that would have a minimum capital requirement 
of €100,000 and would “operate on a homogenous European basis”); Heine, supra 
note 48, at 108 (noting that the SE is an attempt by the European Union to deter 
regulatory competition and preserve individual state models of corporate 
governance). 
